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Abstract 
A study is conducted on a new airworthiness compliance verification method based on pilot-aircraft-environment complex 
system simulation. Verification scenarios are established by “block diagram” method based on airworthiness criteria. A pi-
lot-aircraft-environment complex model is set up and a virtual flight testing method based on connection of MATLAB/Simulink 
and Flightgear is proposed. Special researches are conducted on the modeling of pilot manipulation stochastic parameters and 
manipulation in critical situation. Unfavorable flight factors of certain scenario are analyzed, and reliability modeling of impor-
tant system is researched. A distribution function of small probability event and the theory on risk probability measurement are 
studied. Nonlinear function is used to depict the relationship between the cumulative probability and the extremum of the critical 
parameter. A synthetic evaluation model is set up, modified genetic algorithm (MGA) is applied to ascertaining the distribution 
parameter in the model, and a more reasonable result is obtained. A clause about vehicle control functions (VCFs) verification in 
MIL-HDBK-516B is selected as an example to validate the practicability of the method. 
Keywords: aircraft; airworthiness; certification; pilot model; flight simulation; flight safety 
1. Introduction1
Airworthiness compliance verification is an essen-
tial part for a new aircraft to obtain its airworthiness 
certificate (AC). Methods of airworthiness compliance 
verification involve compliance statement, explanatory 
documents, analysis/calculation, safety assessment, 
laboratory tests, aircraft ground test, flight testing, air-
craft inspection and equipment eligibility inspection. 
However, to verify the safety performance of the 
whole aircraft affected by unfavorable factors, the 
above ten methods are not enough. Those traditional 
methods, such as laboratory test, aircraft ground test 
and flight testing have their weaknesses such as high 
cost, long time for preparation and execution, and dif-
                                                 
*Corresponding author. Tel.: +86-29-84787637. 
E-mail address: xuhaojun@mail.xjtu.edu.cn 
Foundation items: National Natural Science Foundation of China 
(60572172, 61074007) 
1000-9361 © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. 
doi:10.1016/S1000-9361(11)60434-2 
ficulties in checking all flight conditions in aircraft 
operational domain, especially in complex and critical 
situations [1-2]. 
The verification method based on complex system 
simulation has its unique advantages. A) This new 
airworthiness verification method could be applied to 
the phase of aircraft design, so that the design process 
can be optimized, the cost reduced, and schedule short-
ened. B) Conducting “virtual flight-testing” prior to 
detailed design can reduce the cost greatly with the 
total amount of test and certification (T&C) flight 
hours being reduced. C) A safer and more accurate 
flight envelope is formed by conducting safety as-
sessment in complex and critical conditions, thus en-
hancing aircraft airworthiness and safety level [3-4]. 
Airworthiness verification always refers to risk prob- 
ability assessment. The occurrence probability of flight 
accident is very small. Therefore, small risk evaluation 
method using limited amount of samples obtained 
from “pilot-aircraft-environment” complex system 
simulation is a significant problem to be solved [5]. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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2.  Modeling of Complex System Based on Veri- 
fication Scenario 
Modeling of “pilot-aircraft-environment” system is 
the groundwork of system simulation. And the model-
ing is always based on specific scenario. So the first 
step of airworthiness verification is the construction of 
a scenario according to specific airworthiness clause. 
There are three components in the complex system, 
including pilot, aircraft and environment. 
2.1.  Potential hazard analysis and establishment
of scenarios 
Scenarios of flight testing are established according 
to clauses in airworthiness criteria [6]. In the U.S., Fed-
eral Aviation Regulations (FAR) are promulgated by 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). FAR series are 
the standards for air traffic control, qualification of 
production license and airworthiness certificate, etc. 
The U.S. has more comprehensive civil aviation air-
worthiness criteria, such as FAR 23, 25, 27, 33 which 
include specific airworthiness standards for various 
systems of the aircraft. China Civil Aviation Regula-
tions (CCAR) series are formed on the basis of the U.S. 
civil aviation airworthiness standards. Currently, the 
U.S. F-22, F-35 and other advanced fighters have 
brought in airworthiness idea and used MIL-HDBK- 
516B as the basis for aircraft design. 
Accident chain starts from hazard factors. Thus, po-
tential hazard analysis of certain clauses in airworthi-
ness criterion is the basis of the scenarios’ establish-
ment. Hazard analysis methods include fault mode and 
effect analysis (FMEA), event tree analysis (ETA), 
fault tree analysis (FTA), hazard checklist method, 
engineering experience method, etc [7]. 
“Block diagram” is adopted in this paper to establish 
scenarios. The function of scenario is depicting poten-
tial accident chains in a certain airworthiness clause. 
Its main components include potential hazard factors 
effecting flight safety, effects of hazard factors on air-
craft motion and safety decisive parameters. 
An example is introduced to illustrate the process of 
founding a flight scenario. Clause 6.2.4.2 in vehicle 
control functions (VCFs) in Chapter 6 of MIL- 
HDBK-516B is selected. The specification of this 
clause is “all single point failures are identified with 
the associated probability of failure(s) and that they 
demonstrate an acceptable flight safety risk” [8]. 
Using the “cannikin law”, the weakest link of the 
VCF should be found first. According to the reliability 
test of a fly-by-wire and the flight record of the exem-
plified aircraft, nz (normal overload) sensor and roll 
rate sensor are the organs that most likely to fail [9]. 
Thus, there are two potential accident chains caused by 
two sensors’ malfunction. Failures of sensors lead to 
the malfunction of elevator and aileron. The safety 
decisive parameters of the two possible accident chains 
are $ (angle of attack (AOA)), nz or p (roll rate). 
Flight scenario of this clause is shown in Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1  Flight scenario of Clause 6.2.4.2 in MIL-HDBK-516B. 
2.2.  Stochastic pilot model 
1) Stochastic modeling of pilot behavior parameters 
Statistical property analysis of pilot behavior pa-
rameters show that the static gain of pilot Kp, with 
minimal constraints, is close to meeting the lognormal 
distribution law. The lognormal distribution density 
function of random variable x is [10] 
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Histogram is established according to parameter 
identification of the pilot manipulation. Through com-
parison, it can be seen that the model based on log-
normal distribution law (solid line) is more accurate 
than the model based on normal distribution law (tri-
angle line), as shown in Fig. 2. 
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Fig. 2  Lognormal distribution density function and histo-
gram. 
(0, 1) uniform distribution is the simplest and most 
basic distribution law. Any other random variable can 
be obtained through its transformation. Mathematical 
methods can be used to obtain random numbers that 
submit to other distribution from (0, 1) uniform distri-
bution. The following text refers to the deduction of 
logarithmic normal distribution and truncated normal 
distribution random numbers’ generation method.  
According to the lognormal distribution density 
function, set 
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Inverse transformation principle is used to generate 
random numbers subject to the truncated normal dis-
tribution. Set that random number mi obeys (0,1) uni-
form distribution. If 0.5im ! , then im  falls into the 
range of left-censored; if 0.5im  , then mi falls into the 
right-censored interval. When it is in the left truncated 
interval, then 
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where Dmin is the minimum value of x, c1 a positive 
constant, 1  the variance of x, m0 the cumulative 
probability 0 min( = ( ))m P X D . 
According to the distribution of * +2,N %  , the 
maximum of random numbers xi is calculated with the 
cumulative probability 1 0ic m m . Similarly, process 
mi which falls into the right-censored interval, and 
( )1 2, , , nX x x x   obeys the truncated normal distri-
bution.  
The simulated pilot behavior parameters gained 
through the above-mentioned mathematical methods 
have eight groups, as shown in Table 1. In the table,´ 
is the time delay, T1 is the lead compensation time 
constant, T2 is time delay of transmission and process-
ing of central informationn, TN is the neuromuscular 
delay time. 
Table 1  Pilot model parameters 
Simulation 
results 
KP ,  T1 T2 TN 
1st 2.020 0.105 0.213 0.274 0.094
2nd 1.627 0.204 0.093 0.331 0.312
3rd 2.267 0.076 0.226 0.163 0.168
4th 1.239 0.264 0.112 0.236 0.041
5th 2.117 0.210 0.312 0.121 0.177
6th 1.319 0.335 0.505 0.093 0.085
7th 5.587 0.108 0.204 0.618 0.055
8th 1.205 0.172 0.143 0.259 0.108
Mean 
value 
2.173 0.184 0.226 0.262 0.130
Variance 2.075 0.008 0.018 0.024 0.008
 
The calculated mean and variance are close to 
the identification of the true results. Taking the 
first simulation for example, the results of pilot 
model simulation match the real practice, which is 
shown in Fig. 3. In the figure, T is the simulation 
time. 
 
Fig. 3  Output signal of pilot behavior stochastic model. 
2) Pilot manipulation model in critical situation 
The research is focused on pilot manipulation mod-
eling after a severe failure of certain key system. Pilot 
feels drastic change of acceleration caused by the fail-
ure, and has the response to counteract this change by 
manipulation. The pilot’s control strategy can be un-
derstood as eliminating the sudden change of flight 
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status, reducing adverse consequences as caused by 
non-human factors. 
The established pilot model is shown in Fig. 4. In 
the figure, Y (f0, x0, v0, t) is the function, f0 is rod 
rorce, x0 is rod displacement, v0 is speed of pilot 
manipulate the rod, t is time of pilot manipulate the 
rod. 
 
Fig. 4  Pilot control model for special circumstances. 
Assuming that the initial pilot handling characteris-
tic involved in closed-loop control is Y(t), the effective 
time is T , the time that unit Ċ converts to unit 
--- is 
pt t T   , where tp is the delay time of pilot 
manipulation, and according to the conversions be-
tween units at different time instants, the model’s in-
put-output relationship can be described as 
p
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where Pout is the final output of pilot, Xin(t) the input 
offset signal, G(t) the pilot quasilinear function when 
the changes of flight parameters are stable, h(t) pilot 
noise function. 
The most important parameter of the model is the 
delay time of pilot manipulation tp. In this paper, the 
probability distribution method is used to establish the 
mathematical model of tp. 
Pilot average response delay time tb calculated by 
simulation is 1.209. Formula bB
2
ln ln 
1
t
t
k


 is 
applied [10] to gaining the mathematical expectation of 
the delay time: Bln  t  0.043 8 . A constant to de-
scribe the differences of pilot manipulation in tilt 
channel is 0.5k  , and the variance of latency is cal-
culated to be 22 ln 1 0.223 1D k   . The pilot ma-
nipulation delay time subjects to lognormal distribu-
tion tp obeys LN( 0.043 8, 0.223 1).   
The simulation result of pilot delay time stochastic 
model using Monte Carlo method is shown in Fig. 5.  
 
Fig. 5  Pilot delay time stochastic model. 
2.3.  Aircraft model and external environment model-
ing
Flight risk is always related to scenario in critical 
state. Due to coupling and non-linear characteristics of 
parameter changes, the non-linear six-degree-of-free 
dom mathematical model of aircraft flight dynamics is 
adopted. These equations are a set of high-rank 
non-linear coupling differential coefficient equations, 
from which dynamic characteristics of an aircraft is 
obtained. Generally, appropriate equation simplifica-
tion can be made according to specific problem. In the 
study of rolling characteristics, changes of velocity can 
be neglected, so equations can be changed into 
five-degree-of-freedom differential coefficient equa-
tions. 
Aircraft fly-by-wire control system is usually con-
structed on the basis of Simulink. For a specific air-
craft, the model of airframe and control system is 
fixed. 
The key point of environment research is adverse 
operational situation, involving some events and phe-
nomena in atmospheric environment or in air corridor, 
which could threaten flight safety. Such events and 
phenomena include adverse weather condition (wind 
shear, turbulence, heavy rain, icing, thunderstorm, at-
mosphere discharge), flying birds and possible objects 
that may cause collision, wake vortex left by aircraft, 
wet runway, etc. The corresponding simulation model 
can be set up according to specific situation [11], and 
the related impact on aircraft movement is involved in 
the equations. 
3.  Potential Risk Analysis and Reliability Model-
 ing of Scenarios 
3.1.  Analysis of potential risk  
The risks of flight testing come mainly from the 
following aspects: risks from new products, new sys-
tems and new component parts, risks from critical fly-
ing conditions, risks from technologies in new ex-
plored areas, and risks caused by human factors and 
adverse environment. 
Changes that take place from hazard to accident is 
an evolution process of the system status. The transi-
tion process from safe to unsafe state can be depicted 
as an accident chain (see Fig. 6). 
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Fig. 6  Block diagram of risk evolution. 
Risk analysis methods include FMEA, ETA, FTA, 
hazard checklists law, and engineering experience 
method, etc [7]. Based on the theory of accident chain 
and the ideas of FMEA, mathematical models of rep-
resentative failure mode are established as follows. 
3.2.  Failure mode modeling and effects analysis 
The performance type of the failure is called failure 
mode, which describes the basic characteristics of 
product failure. Research of failure model involves 
three aspects, failure mode, failure impact on flight 
safety, and failure probability. The failure mode con-
cept provides clues and evidence for fault identifica-
tion and comprehensive failure analysis. Typical fail-
ure modes are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2  Typical failure modes 
Serial 
number 
Failure mode 
Serial 
number 
Failure mode 
1 
Structural failure 
(broken) 
10 External leak 
2 Tied knot, or stuck on 11 
Beyond tolerance 
(maximum) 
3 Vibration 12 
Beyond tolerance 
(minimum) 
4 
Failure to keep the 
normal position 
13 Run accident 
5 Failure to open 14 Intermittent work 
6 Failure to close 15 Shift work 
7 Open error 16 Error indication 
8 Close error 17 Poor circulation 
9 Internal leak 18 Incorrect action 
Modeling of system’s weak links is an important 
foundation for flight safety quantitative assessment. In 
this paper, research is conducted on the modeling of 
aircraft failures in key systems, and fly-by-wire system 
is taken as an example. 
Fly-by-wire system failures occur generally in two 
aspects, including sensor failure and actuator failure. 
The mathematical models of sensor failure modes are 
established as follows: 
yiout represents the actual output of No. i sensor, and 
yiin represents the normal input of No. i sensor. 
1) Sensor stuck model 
The failure model of No. i sensor is 
 out ( )i iy t a  (6) 
where ai is a constant, 1,2, ,i m  . 
2) Failure model of sensor constant gain changes  
The failure model of No. i sensor is 
 out in( ) ( )i i iy t y t.  (7) 
where i.  is the constant changes in the proportion of 
the gain coefficient, 1,2, ,i m  . 
3) Constant bias sensor failure fault model  
The failure model of No. i sensor is 
 out i n( ) ( )i i iy t y t #   (8) 
where i# is a constant, 1,2, ,i m  . 
4) General sensor fault model 
The failure behavior of the above three sensors 
could result in control function errors, so for the con-
trol system type, a sensor fault is usually expressed as 
 
s
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
x t x t u t
y t x t f t
 
  
A B
C Q  (9) 
where A is the state matrix, B the input matrix, C the 
output matrix, m g	/RQ  the sensor fault distribution 
matrix, and s ( )
gf t /R  the function of the failure 
impact on the system output. 
4.  Risk Probability Assessment Model 
4.1. Basic model  
S is the cumulative probability series, and x S/ . R  
is the random variable set of extremum sample, and 
y R/ . On the double negative logarithm scaling axis 
(DNLSA), the coordinate of x is xln(ln x) [12]. 
It can be supposed that x/S, and S is the set of 
cumulated probability series on the DNLSA. 
According to the scatter plot, the mapping g(SėR) 
can be ascertained. By statistical analysis on a number 
of data groups, it can be found that the scatter dia-
grams are likely to be linear distribution adopting 
DNLGA. So the mapping can be solved by linear re-
gress as expressed in[13] 
 ( )g "  axb (10) 
where a and b are the coefficients of the equation. So 
the nonlinear function is 
 f (x) ( ln( ln ))a x b     (11) 
The occurrence probability is 
 
1
li1 ' ( )P f y
   (12) 
where liy is the limit of y. 
4.2.  Nonlinear regress model 
In fact, extremum samples are restricted by bound-
ary, and this fact is not considered in the basic model. 
Thus, a calculation model containing adjusting pa-
rameter is set up in this paper by nonlinear regress. 
The function ln
c by x   is selected as the 
match curve. It can be transformed to ln cx b y  . 
The assessment model ( ) e
c
b
YF Y

  is set up. It can 
be deduced that lnY y ˈ ln( ln )X x   ˈ 1/k c , 
bkln b. Hence, the linear function is obtained 
 + 'Y kX b  (13) 
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The nonlinear regress model is 
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where L is the boundary value of random extreme 
samples. 
The model can be considered a linear model after 
logarithm transformation of the cumulative probability 
and double negative logarithm function transformation 
of random extremum. 
4.3. Synthesis assessment model 
The scattered points on transformed coordinates are 
linear fitting in the nonlinear model, but larger error may 
be produced. It can be more precise applying cubic 
polynomial. The synthesis assessment model is set up. 
 
3 2
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 (15) 
The parameters C4, C3, C2, C1 of the polynomial can 
be obtained by least-square method. And the objective 
function is the error in the transformed coordinates. It 
will be more reliable that the target function is the er-
ror in the original coordinates. The objective function 
can be expressed as 
 
2
=1
' '= ( ( ( )))
k
n n
n
E Y f F Y  (16) 
The objective function is complex and nonlinear. 
The adjusting parameter for distribution can be opti-
mized by modified genetic algorithm (MGA) [14]. Ge-
netic algorithm (GA) can search for the optimal solu-
tion by random mode and has a better ability as a 
whole. But the algorithm is weak in local searching, 
and easy to become premature. Simulated annealing 
has a stronger capability in local searching. To avoid 
the disadvantage of GA, a mixed algorithm applying 
simulated annealing (SA) to GA is adopted, and the 
flow chart is shown in Fig. 7. 
 
Fig. 7  Flow chart of MGA. 
The mode of coding is binary-valued. The fitness is 
acquired from the transformation of the objective 
function and adjusted by fitness linear scaling for 
population diversity. Operation of GA is the adaptive 
genetic algorithm (AGA) proposed by Srinvivas, 
which can adaptively choose the probability of cross-
over and mutationˊIn order to avoid getting the local 
optimal solution in early evolution, the elitist selection 
is adopted 
[15]
. 
4.4.  Calculation case 
In certain aircraft flight status, the safety critical pa-
rameter is lift coefficient CL. Twenty extreme samples 
are obtained by flight data recorder (FDR) and shown 
in Table 3. The limit value of CL is xli=1.25, and the 
parameters cannot reach the boundary value 1.4 
[9]
. 
Figure 8 depicts the whole process of GA, and Fig. 9 
describes the searching process of SA for one time. It 
can be found that the calculation on the synthesis as-
sessment model converges by using MGA. The frac-
tional error is in the range of 8, and the detailed calcu-
lation results are shown in Table 4. The curve of the 
approximating function for the optimal solution is 
shown in Figs. 10-11. Risk probability is 0.040 2. 
Table 3  Samples of extremum of critical parameter CL
Data 1 group 0.688 0.722 0.822 0.902 0.698 0.657 0.753 1.095 0.634 0.648 
Data 2 group 0.932 0.720 0.591 0.798 0.929 0.564 0.743 0.753 1.210 0.696 
 
 
Fig. 8  Process of searching for optimal solution (GA). 
 
Fig. 9  Process of searching for optimal solution (SA). 
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Table 4  Calculation results 
Coefficient C/10
2
 
Arithmetic 
C1 C2 C3 C4 
Fractional error/104 Probabilistic risk/102 
GA ˉ34.95 ˉ14.45 ˉ2.40 ˉ2.45 57.54 3.86 
1 ˉ35.43 ˉ14.04 ˉ1.54 ˉ2.88 55.94 4.02 
2 ˉ35.42 ˉ14.12 ˉ1.52 ˉ2.82 55.99 3.95 
3 ˉ35.19 ˉ14.11 ˉ1.60 ˉ2.76 56.20 3.90 
MGA 
4 ˉ35.25 ˉ13.82 ˉ1.51 ˉ2.98 55.96 4.21 
 
 
Fig. 10  Curve of the approximating function (linear). 
 
Fig. 11  Curve of the approximating function (DNLSA). 
5.  Main Idea of the Method 
The main idea of the airworthiness compliance 
verification based on the complex system simulation 
proposed in this paper can be illustrated in Fig. 12. 
The verification process can be divided into six steps: 
1) Verification scenario is established according to 
airworthiness standards and correlative materials. 
2) Pilot-aircraft-operational environment model is 
built based on the scenario established in Step 1. 
3) Hazard analysis and reliability modeling are car-
ried out to obtain potential hazards of the system and 
occurrence rate of hazards. 
4) The scenario is simulated in a computer based on 
the work done in Step 2 and Step 3, which can also be 
called virtual flight testing. 
5) The extreme value of determined parameters are 
gathered through simulation, and flight risk is calcu-
lated using EVT [13].  
6) Combining the results of Step 3 and Step 5, safety 
verification and measures for improving flight safety 
are obtained, which is the goal of this method.  
 
Fig.12  Airworthiness compliance verification process based on complex system simulation.
6.  Exemplification 
The failure in fly-by-wire system may cause catastro-
phic consequence. How to improve its safety and reli-
ability is a key technology in its development. The reli-
ability of fly-by-wire system is critical to flight safety. So 
the Clause 6.2.4.2 in VCFs in Chapter 6 of MIL-HDBK- 
516B is selected to be verified.  
6.1.  Analysis of airworthiness clause and scenario
foundation
The Clause 6.2.4.2 regulates that flight risk caused by 
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single point failures of VCFs should be “acceptable”. The 
quantitative requirement of fly-by-wire system is regu-
lated by GJB2878-97 “general specification for fly-by- 
wire flight control system of piloted aircraft (fixed 
wing)” from three aspects including catastrophic failure, 
loss probability of aircraft and availability of urgent/spare 
system. The loss probability caused by failure of flight 
control system is prescribed quantitatively in 
GJB2878-97. Flight accident risk of light aircraft and 
fighter is no more than 100h107/h [16]. The assessment 
probability is verified according to this quantitative stan-
dard in the following part. Measures and index sugges-
tion for aircraft design can be obtained by verification [17]. 
6.2.  Complex modeling and simulation 
Flight testing scenario of this clause is founded in 
Section 2.1, and is shown in Fig. 1. Modeling and 
simulation are based on this scenario. 
Firstly, the failure model of the scenario is founded. 
The failure of overload sensor in fly-by-wire system can 
cause uncommanded deflection of elevator, and the de-
flection step of elevator can cause a sudden elevation or 
descent, which may lead to the paranormal of nz and $ . 
A negative elevator angle can cause nondirective eleva-
tion, and the angle of attack is selected as a crucial pa-
rameter. A positive elevator angle may cause nondirective 
decent, and overload is the crucial parameter.  
The failure model of overload sensor is stuck model 
yiout(t)=ai. It is analyzed statistically that the failure 
value of elevator deflection conforms to the normal 
distribution with maximum and minimum values [5]; 
the region of value is (8°, 8°). 
The failure value of roll rate sensor conforms to 
uniform distribution. The mathematical expression of 
failure model is 
t
min max min
Normal
Rand Failure
                                               
( ) (0,1)    
i
i
x
x
x x x
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(17)
 
where xi is the value of sensor, tix the normal operating 
value of roll rate sensor, and Rand (0,1) a random 
number in the region of (0,1). The failure value of ai-
leron deflection is (5°,3°). Histogram of failure angle 
of elevator or aileron is established, as shown in Fig. 13. 
 
Fig. 13  Deflection of elevator and aileron caused by two 
sensors. 
The non-linear six-degree-of-freedom mathematical 
model of aircraft flight dynamics is programmed in 
MATLAB 7.4. pilot manipulation model in critical 
situation which is illuminated in Section 2.2, is chosen 
as the pilot model in this example. 
After the establishment of pilot, aircraft and failure 
models, a virtual flight testing method based on the 
connection of MATLAB/Simulink and Flightgear is 
proposed. The simulation framework of the method is 
shown in Fig. 14. 
 
Fig. 14  Simulation framework based on connection of 
MATLAB/Simulink and Flightgear. 
Failure deflection and pilot manipulation are the in-
puts of the simulation, and the outputs are AOA, nz and 
p, etc. Flight after two sensors’ malfunction is simu-
lated, and part of simulation results is shown in Figs. 
15-17. 
 
Fig. 15  Pilot’s visual in the beginning of simulation. 
 
Fig. 16  Rapid pitching of aircraft caused by nz sensor’s 
failure. 
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Fig. 17  AOA, pitch angle, pitch rate and elevator variation 
with time after failure of nz sensor. 
6.3.  Calculation of flight risk as caused by single
 failure 
The complex system is simulated with the 
Monte-Carlo method. And extremum samples of $ , 
zn  or p
 
can be obtained. 
1) Flight risk probability caused by overload sensor 
Repeat the simulation with Monte-Carlo for 100 
times, and 100 values of elevator angle were obtained; 
57 values are negative, and the others are positive. 
Risk probability calculated by the small probability 
assessment method based on EVT (nonlinear regress 
model) is 0.033 6, which evaluates negative failure 
deflection. The relationship between extreme value 
and standard warp is shown in Fig. 18. 
 
Fig. 18  Sample extreme value and standard warp (AOA). 
Similarly, the extreme values of nz are used to cal-
culate the flight risk based on EVT (linear regress 
model). The result is 0.036 6. The relationship between 
the extreme value and standard warp is shown in Fig. 19. 
 
Fig. 19  Sample extreme value and standard warp (negative 
overload). 
The failure probability of this overload sensor con-
forms to Weibull distribution according to the conclu-
sion in Section 3. In this case, it has been used for 100 h, 
so the failure rate is 5(100) 2.0 100  	 . So the flight 
risk probability caused by this overload sensor is 
 
61.4 10Q P0   	   (18) 
It is shown that aircraft loss probability in one hour 
caused by the failure of this system satisfies the quan-
titative requirement of GJB2878-97. Thus, it cannot 
satisfy the requirement of MIL-HDBK-516B. 
2) Risk probability caused by roll rate sensor 
The largest permitted value of roll rate is
 
90°/s. 
Similarly, risk probability obtained from the small 
probability assessment method based on EVT is 
0.054 5.  
The reliability of roll rate sensor in landscape orien-
tation channel submits to exponential distribution, and 
the failure probability is 43.0 10	 . The total risk of 
each flight in one hour is 
 
4 2 53.0 10 5.45 10 1.64 10Q    	 	 	  	  (19) 
It means that the flight risk caused by this failure 
does not satisfy the quantitative demand of 
GJB2878-97. 
In summary, this flight control system cannot satisfy 
the requirement of the Clause 6.2.4.2 in MIL- 
HDBK-516B. Thus, corresponding flight safety meas-
ures must be taken to improve it. The flight risk caused 
by equipment failure is closely related to the reliability 
of components and the interaction between compo-
nents. Therefore, three pieces of advice are brought 
forward. First, the reliability of this nz sensor should be 
improved, or it should be changed to a new one at ear-
lier time. Second, the influence of failure must be 
weakened, so as to improve the robustness of the pi-
lot-aircraft system. Third, pilot training of such kind of 
situation should be emphasized. 
7.  Conclusions 
A method has been developed for airworthiness com-
pliance verification based on pilot-aircraft-environment 
complex system simulation. Special researches are 
conducted on verification scenariosˈstochastic pilot 
modeling, optimized risk evaluation model and virtual 
flight testing. The method is fit for both civilian and 
military aircraft. 
The distinguishing advantages of this method in-
clude its low cost, good repeatability and controllabil-
ity in airworthiness verification research. The pro-
posed method can also focus on complex and high-risk 
situations difficult to research by real flight testing. 
Thus, more valuable conclusions can be obtained for 
airworthiness verification and aircraft safety design. 
The challenge of future work may include modeling 
and simulation of aircraft safety critical systems and 
· 690· XU Haojun et al. / Chinese Journal of Aeronautics 25(2012) 681-690 No.5 
 
their dynamic performance analysis after failure. 
Meanwhile, validation of simulation results is another 
challenge. 
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